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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
present decision should have, and already has had,3 ' that effect. Per-
haps the cure lies in Congressional enactment of a permanent meas-
uring rod.82
PRACTICE AND PLEADING-APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 23 OF
THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT-CHANGE OF PARTIES.-In 1946 plaintiff
brought suit against PRC Pictures. The contracts upon which the
complaint relied contained a nine-month period of limitation within
which an action must be commenced on a claim arising under the
contracts. Because of the failure of the plaintiff's president to obey
court orders for examination before trial, plaintiff's action was dis-
missed on the merits.' On appeal the judgment was affirmed but
modified to provide for dismissal not upon the merits. 2  Plaintiff
then commenced a new action, after the time limited in the contracts
but within one year after dismissal, against Pathe Industries, who in
the meantime had acquired all the assets of the dissolved PRC, in-
cluding the subject matter of the dismissed suit. The district court
held the claim barred by the nine-month period of limitation.3 Held,
reversed. The suit was timely brought within the meaning of Section
23 of the New York Civil Practice Act.4 The fact that defendant
was not a party to the earlier suit is not controlling. Where the
parties to the second suit are identical in interest with the parties to
the first, Section 23 applies. Producers Releasing Corp. De Cuba v.
Pathe Industries, Inc., 184 F. 2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950).
s1 See, e.g., Paramount Industries, Inc. v. Solar Products Corp., 88 U. S.
Patent Quarterly 233 (2d Cir. 1951); Vapor Blast Manufacturing Co. v.
Pangborn Corp., 186 F. Zd 230 (4th Cir. 1950); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
Black and Decker Manufacturing Co., 94 F. Supp. 938 (D. C. Md. 1951).
82 See Henry, Standards of Invention in Mechanical Cases, 32 J. PAT. OFF.
Socdy 97 (1950).
1 Cf. Producers Releasing Corp. De Cuba v. PRC Pictures, Inc., 8 F. R. D.
254 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
2 Producers Releasing Corp. De Cuba v. PRC Pictures, Inc., 176 F. 2d 93
(2d Cir. 1949).
3 Producers Releasing Corp. De Cuba v. Pathe Industries, Inc., 10 F. R. D.
29 (S. D. N. Y. 1950) (the court held that the dismissal of the original suit
had been for neglect to prosecute).
4N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 23 provides: "If an action is commenced within
the time limited therefor, and a judgment therein is reversed on appeal without
awarding a new trial, or the action is terminated in any other manner than by
a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prose-
cute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the plaintiff, or, if he
dies and the cause of action survives, his representative, may commence a new
action for the same cause after the expiration of the time so limited and within
one year after such a reversal or termination."
Section 23 applies to limitations by statute or contract. Littrell v. Allemania
Fire Ins. Co., 224 App. Div. 523, 231 N. Y. Supp. 520 (3d Dep't 1928), rev'd
on other grounds, 250 N. Y. 628, 166 N. E. 350 (1929).
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The legal effect of Section 23 is to toll the operation of the
statute of limitations 5 pending the continuance of an action and to
start a new period of limitation from the dismissal provided the
original action was instituted in proper time.6 Since the purpose
of Section 23 is to assure a decision on the merits 7 it has been held
that its provisions must be liberally construed.8 Thus, although in
terms applicable only to actions, it has been construed to encompass
special proceedings.9 However, in order for the tolling provision of
Section 23 to apply, it is necessary that the previous action be com-
menced,'0 that the present action would ordinarily now be barred by
a statute of limitations' 1 and that the former action had failed for
some reason other than a decision on the merits,' 2 a voluntary dis-
continuance ' or a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prose-
cute.14 Its application is further delimited by the requirements that
the former action be for the same cause,' 5 that the new action be
5 Section 23 is inapplicable to those actions where the limitation is regarded
as a condition precedent to the right to sue. Hill v. Supervisors, 119 N. Y.
344, 23 N. E. 921 (1890) ; Carr v. Yokohoma Specie Bank, 272 App. Div. 64,
69 N. Y. S. 2d 262 (1st Dep't 1947).
6 Where the bar of the New York limitations is complete when a sister
state action is commenced, Section 23 is inapplicable to a subsequent action
brought in New York. Baker v. Cohn, 266 App. Div. 236, 41 N. Y. S. 2d
765 (1st Dep't 1943).
7 People ex rel. Wheeler v. Neafsey, 142 Misc. 692, 255 N. Y. Supp. 477
(Sup. Ct. 1931).8 Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N. Y. 533, 109 N. E. 594 (1915).
91n re Schlesinger's Estate, 36 App. Div. 77, 55 N. Y. Supp. 514 (1st
Dep't 1899).
'OErickson v. Macy, 236 N. Y. 412, 140 N. E. 938 (1923) (prior action
held not commenced where service of summons by publication was obtained
under a void order); Knox v. Beckford, 258 App. Div. 823, 15 N. Y. S. 2d
174 (3d Dep't 1939), aff'd nem., 285 N. Y. 762, 34 N. E. 2d 911 (1941) (prior
action not commenced where service of summons was set aside because of
failure to file proper proof of service within the prescribed time). Section 23
has been held applicable where the prior action was dismissed for want ofjurisdiction. Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N. Y. 533, 109 N. E. 594
(1915); Gustafson v. A-B Svenska Amerika Linier, 258 App. Div. 734, 14
N. Y. S. 2d 905 (2d Dep't 1939). See PRAsHxnm, Nmv YoRK PRAc'rrcn § 37,
n. 103 (1947).
12Holland v. Schwartz, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 283 (1940), affd, 259 App. Div.
1083, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 197 (2d Dep't 1940) ; Caulston v. Rosenfeld, 175 Misc.
479, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (Section 23 is not applicable where
bar of limitations never became effective because of infancy).
'
22Buchholz v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 269 App. Div. 49, 53 N. Y. S.
2d 603 (1st Dep't 1945); Sauerbier v. Erie R. R., 195 Misc. 880, 90 N. Y. S.
2d 43 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (Section 23 is not applicable to action on theory of
common law negligence where prior action under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act was terminated on the merits).
13 O'Neil v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 159 App. Div. 313, 145 N. Y. Supp.
432 (4th Dep't 1913), aff'd without opinion, 216 N. Y. 692, 110 N. E. 1045(1915).
14 Loomis v. Girard Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 443, 10 N. Y.
S. 2d 283 (3d Dep't 1939).
15 Victor Process Co. v. Pile Products Corp., 274 App. Div. 907, 83 N. Y. S.
2d 89 (2d Dep't 1948), aff'd, 299 N. Y. 561, 85 N. E. 2d 790 (1949).
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commenced within a year after the termination of the prior action 10
and that the parties to both actions be the same.
17
In the instant case the defendant, relying on Breen v. State,18
contended that since it was not a party to the prior action Section
23 should not be applied. The 6ourt refused to follow the Breen
case on the ground that it was in conflict with two earlier higher
court decisions. The first of these, Gaines v. City of New York,19
concerned a mistake in the court's jurisdiction and not a change in
parties. The second case, Van der Stegen v. Neuss, Hesslein &
Co., 20 involved the addition of a party plaintiff in the second action
and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals without implementing Sec-
tion 23.21 However, as noted by the court, the Breen case essentially
involved a mistaken belief by the party that the court had jurisdiction
and, as such, was in conflict with at least the spirit of the Gaines
case. The Breen case was also in conflict with the spirit of the
Van der Stegen decision insofar as the latter case held that the addi-
tion of a party plaintiff whose interest was the same as the previous
plaintiff did not constitute a new cause of action.
The court then distinguished Streeter v. Graham & Norton Co. 22
on the basis that there the plaintiff in the second action did not rep-
resent the identical interests of the plaintiff in the first action. In
the present action the defendant represented all the interests of the
16 McGovern v. Curran, 194 N. Y. Supp. 21 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
17 Mehrer v. North Ninth Lumber Co., 195 Misc. 566, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 285
(Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 275 App. Div. 1059, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 178 (2d Dep't 1949) ;
Gibbon v. City of New York, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 34 (Supp. Ct. 1946) (a plaintiff
is the same in both actions although he sues in a representative capacity in the
second action).
3s 179 Misc. 42, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 371 (Ct. Cl. 1942). The Court of Claims
held that a Supreme Court action against a state agency having been dismissed
on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction, the action being essentially
against the state, could not be revived under Section 23 in a suit against the
state because the parties to both actions were not the same.
19215 N. Y. 533, 109 N. E. 594 (1915). Here the earlier action was brought
against the City of New York in the City Court where it was dismissed upon
the ground that the City Court had no jurisdiction over actions against the city.
Plaintiff, in a subsequent action brought in the proper court, was held entitled
to the benefits of Section 23.
20243 App. Div. 122, 276 N. Y. Supp. 624 (1st Dep't 1934).
21 270 N. Y. 55, 200 N. E. 577 (1936). Here the plaintiff brought the second
action within the period of limitation. After the statutory period had expired
the trustee in bankruptcy was brought into the action as an added party plaintiff.
The court held that the addition of the trustee as a party did not create a
new cause of action which would be barred by the statute of limitations. The
court then stated: "We do not touch upon the effect of section 23. ... We
need not discuss it." Id. at 63, 200 N. E. at 580.
22 263 N. Y. 39, 188 N. E. 150 (1933). The first action was brought by an
insurance carrier as statutory assignee of the beneficiaries entitled to recover
damages for wrongful death. The action was dismissed on the ground that
the plaintiff was not the assignee of all the persons entitled to share in the
damages recovered. A second action brought by the administratrix representing
all of the next of kin was held not saved by section 23 since it ". . . was not
brought by the same plaintiff or representative." Id. at 44, 188 N. E. at 151.
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defendant in the first action. The fact that the defendant may have
represented other interests in addition to those derived from PRC
Pictures was held immaterial.
In the determination of state law a federal court may not depart
from what a lower state court announces as law unless convinced
that a higher court of the state would decide otherwise.2 3 It is sub-
mitted that the court was justified in refusing to adopt the strict
identity of party test of the Breen case in view of its clash with the
broad and liberal construction given to Section 23 by the Court of
Appeals in the Gaines case.2 4
ToRTs-DUTY OWED INVITEE AND LiCENsEE.-Plaintiff stum-
bled and fell over a stone block while walking through an alleyway
used in connection with defendant's bus terminal. Defendant was in
possession of the alleyway under a lease wherein he agreed to pro-
mote the maximum flow of traffic through the terminal and passage-
way leading thereto. The objective of such promotion was to increase
business in the stores, luncheonette and other concessions bordering
upon and leading into the terminal, the alleys and arcade. Pedes-
trians to reach the stores in the terminal used the alleyway where
the operative facts occurred. Held, judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
Because of the provision in the lease to encourage business in the
alleyway, plaintiff, a pedestrian, is an invitee or business guest and
not a bare licensee or trespasser. Pedro v.,Newman, 277 App. Div.
567, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 146 (1st Dep't 1950).
A business visitor or invitee is a person who is invited or per-
mitted to enter or remain upon land for a purpose which directly or
indirectly concerns the business of the occupier.' A licensee, on
the other hand, is a person who is privileged to enter upon land
merely by virtue of the possessor's consent.2  The occupier of land
must extend reasonable care to an invitee 3 as to activities 4 or con-
23West v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 311 U. S. 223
(1940).
24 "The statute is designed to insure to the diligent suitor the right to a
hearing in court till he reaches a judgment on the merits. Its broad and
liberal purpose is not to be frittered away by any narrow construction."
Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N. Y. 533, 539, 109 N. E. 594, 596 (1915).
1 Heskell v. Auburn L., H. & P. Co., 209 N. Y. 86, 102 N. E. 540 (1913);
RESTATEmEXT, TORTS § 332 (1934); Paossm, TORTS 635 (1941).
2 Meyer v. Pleshkopf, 277 N. Y. 576, 13 N. E. 777 (1938) ; RESTATEmENT,
TORTS § 330 (1934) ; PPossER, TORTS 625 (1941).
3 Dorsey v. Chautauqua Institution, 203 App. Div. 251, 196 N. Y. Supp.
798 (4th Dep't 1922); RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 341 (1934).
4 See Stelter v. Cordes, 146 App. Div. 300, 130 N. Y. Supp. 688 (2d Dep't
1911); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §341 (1934).
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